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1. Introduction 
Social or other-regarding preferences have been shown to play an important role in many 
areas of human decision making. For instance, when contracts are incomplete, social 
preferences such as inequality aversion or norms like reciprocity have a positive impact on the 
relationship between employers and employees and on the economic efficiency of interaction 
on labor markets (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Charness and 
Dufwenberg, 2006). Caring also for others and not only for oneself is obviously a major 
driving force behind various forms of charitable giving (Harbaugh, 1998; Vesterlund, 2003). 
Bilateral or small-group bargaining is another example for the importance of social 
preferences, since different variants – such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), social welfare considerations of overall efficiency or the 
intention to maximize the welfare of the worst-off party in the reference group (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002) – shape the economic outcome of the bargaining process. 
While the impact of social preferences on economic behavior has been analyzed 
extensively and by now is quite well understood for adults (Camerer, 2003), much less is 
known for children and adolescents. Studying potential changes of social preferences when 
children and teenagers grow up is interesting because it reveals insights into how social 
orientations originate, how they evolve with age and how they interact with relevant socio-
economic and background variables such as gender or the number of siblings. However, 
knowing more on the economic behavior of children and adolescents is also relevant in itself 
because they have become more and more important as economic decision makers and 
consumers in their households (McNeal, 1992; Dauphin et al., 2010). Finally, identifying 
potential changes in social preferences when humans grow up provides an indication on 
possible interventions in education that might help to prevent conflict in interactions of people 
(children) of different age or of different gender. 
In this paper, we present a large-scale experiment with 883 children and adolescents, 
aged eight to seventeen years. Using eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks (taken from 
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), we study the distribution of social preference types across age 
and gender and their interaction with background variables. The eight tasks were designed by 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) to explicitly test and discriminate between selfishness, 
maximin-preferences, efficiency-loving preferences, and two prominent theories of inequality 
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aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, henceforth F&S) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, 
henceforth ERC). According to the choices made in the incentivized allocation decisions, we 
can classify our experimental subjects into the different social preference types. The 
classification is done by conducting a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of subjects’ 
decisions (following, in general, the econometric model used in Costa-Gomes, Crawford and 
Broseta, 2001). The mixture model used here assumes that each subject’s type is drawn from 
a common prior distribution over five types (Selfishness, Efficiency, Maximin, F&S, ERC) and 
that a subject’s type is the same for all eight decisions, but that decision makers are allowed to 
make errors. 
Our results show that roughly 20% of decision makers in our experiment behave 
selfishly, and this fraction does neither depend on age nor on gender. In contrast to the 
apparent stability of the number of selfish types across age and gender, social preferences 
follow a clear pattern. While efficiency concerns are increasing with age in our male sample 
(from about 30% at the age of eight to roughly 50% at the age of seventeen) and stay constant 
around 20% for females, the pattern is reversed for maximin-preferences. The latter become 
more important for females when they grow up, but stay rather constant for boys. Pure 
inequality aversion plays a role for a non-negligible fraction of decision maker in our younger 
age groups, where F&S comes out as the empirically more suitable model to explain choices 
than ERC. In general, pure inequality aversion becomes less important as our subjects grow 
older. 
In recent years, social preferences of children and adolescents have attracted growing 
interest of scholars in economics. Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) present a study with 
229 children aged three to eight years. They show that egalitarianism, i.e., inequality aversion 
develops strongly over these age categories. Children at the age of three and four behave 
selfishly to a very large degree, whereas the majority of children aged seven or eight prefer 
egalitarian allocations that avoid both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. More 
precisely, about 60% of seven- to eight-year old children can be classified as having 
egalitarian preferences, while the corresponding share for three- to four-year olds is only 20%. 
The findings of Fehr et al. (2008) are largely in line with several other papers that have found 
older children to have stronger preferences for egalitarian distributions than younger children. 
Gummerum et al. (2010) find in a dictator game with 77 children aged three to five years that 
older children share more than younger children, and they show that girls are more generous 
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than boys. Benenson, Pascoe and Radmore (2007) use a dictator game with 360 children aged 
four to nine years to demonstrate that older children and those from families with a higher 
socio-economic status behave more altruistically, i.e., prefer more egalitarian choices over 
more selfish ones. Harbaugh, Krause and Liday (2003) report an experiment with 310 
children and teenagers aged seven to eighteen years, showing that young children offer 
considerably less to recipients in the dictator game and the ultimatum game than older 
children and adults. They also show that boys make smaller dictator proposals than girls, 
meaning that boys are, on average, more selfish. Almås et al. (2010) run experiments with 486 
children from ten to eighteen years. They let them play modified dictator games and find that 
children’s fairness norms evolve from favoring equality to favoring equity when they grow 
older. In one of their treatments, they vary the efficiency of the transfer and observe 
significantly stronger efficiency concerns in adolescents than in younger children. In line with 
our findings, they also report a gender effect, i.e. that male adolescents are stronger oriented 
towards efficiency than female adolescents. 
Compared to the existing studies in economics our paper is different in at least three 
dimensions. First, by using the design of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) we are not only able 
to distinguish between selfish and non-selfish preferences. Our experiment allows 
distinguishing between five different social preference types (Selfishness, Efficiency, 
Maximin, F&S, ERC). Second, using a mixture model, we can econometrically estimate for 
each single subject the probability to behave according to a specific social preference type. 
Hence, we are able to exploit our data beyond a mere description of choice frequencies and 
we can estimate the influence of age, gender, and other socio-demographic variables on the 
likelihood to observe a particular type. Third, our subject pool (with more than 800 
participants) is much larger than the largest pool used in the previous studies mentioned 
above, thus clearly increasing the validity of the results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the theoretical 
framework and explain our experimental design. In Section 3 we present the experimental 
results, first on an aggregate level and then on the basis of a mixture model that allows 
assessing the distribution of social preference types across age groups and gender. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
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2. The experiment 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
We define the five types of decision makers regarding their social preferences following 
standard conventions in economics. Let xi and xj be the material payoffs of players i and j. A 
player i that maximizes xi regardless of xj in an allocation decision is said to be selfish (and 
the category is denoted Selfishness in the following). 
Social welfare considerations can take on two specific forms. If subjects maximize 
∑ =j ik kx  they are classified as Efficiency-types (following Utilitarian preferences), and if 
subject i maximizes the },min{ ji xx  with ji xx ≥  they are assigned to the class of Maximin-
type (following Rawlsian preferences). Both forms of social welfare considerations 
(Efficiency and Maximin) play an important role in the well-known behavioral model of 
Charness and Rabin (2002). 
Inequality aversion has been captured in two seminal models. While in the model of 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality is measured as the difference of the own payoff to the 
other players’ payoffs, and subjects have a disutility both from advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality, the so-called ERC-model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) defines 
inequality merely as the deviation of a subject’s payoff from the average payoff in her group. 
More precisely, the utility function of player i  in the model of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) is specified as 
  { } { }∑∑
≠≠
−−−−−−= ij jiiij ijiii xxnxxnxxU 0,max1
10,max
1
1)( βα ,  (1) 
where n is the number of players, and it is assumed that the inequality sensitivity 
parameters satisfy two assumptions: (i) ii αβ ≤  and (ii) 10 <≤ iβ . A subject with 
preferences according to equation (1), given that 0, >ii βα , will be assigned to the F&S-type 
in our data analysis. 
In the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) player i maximizes her motivation 
function, which is given by 
 ),( iiii yvv σ= , (2) 
where iy  denotes the player’s own payoff and iσ  player i ’s share of the total payoff 
in her group. For any given iy  the value of the motivation function is maximized if 
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ncyii /1/ ==σ , where c > 0 is the amount of money to be distributed. A subject with 
preferences according to (2) will be classified as an ERC-type in the following. 
 
2.2. Experimental design 
The design of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) was developed to discriminate between 
Selfishness, Efficiency, Maximin, and inequality aversion of the F&S- and the ERC-type. In 
our experiment, each subject had to choose one out of three different allocations in eight 
different games.1 Each allocation assigns each of three persons (labeled persons 1 to 3) a 
specific amount of money (see Tables 1 to 3 below). Decisions were always made in the role 
of person 2 who had to choose an allocation that distributed money to persons 1, 2 and 3. 
Only at the end the experiment roles were finally determined by grouping three subjects 
together and randomly assigning them roles of person 1, 2 or 3, respectively. Then one 
randomly chosen game was implemented by paying the distribution that had been chosen by 
the subject in the role of person 2.2 The eight games can be classified into three different sets 
of games that are introduced in the following. 
 
2.2.1. Taxation games 
In this set of games, the income of the decision maker (person 2) is the same in all three 
allocations and person 2 is always the “middle income” earner, while person 1 (person 3) is 
always the “high income” (“low income”) earner. We selected two out of the four taxation 
games used in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). The payoffs of the two games are presented in 
Table 1 (games Fx and Ex according to the classification of Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).3 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
                                                 
1 Following the literature we call the experimental task of choosing one out of three allocations a “game”, 
although there is no strategic interaction. Strictly speaking, the task is an individual decision making task on 
allocations of monetary payoffs. 
2 This procedure is an application of the strategy method. Note that Engelmann and Strobel (2004) also used the 
strategy method, but they also report that using the direct response method (where roles are determined right 
from the beginning, meaning that only participants in the role of person 2 had to make decisions) does not 
yield any differences in the distribution of social preferences. 
3 For derivations of the predictions summarized in Table 1, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004). 
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The three allocations can be seen as involving different degrees of redistribution from 
person 1 to person 3. Obviously, one cannot identify selfish types with taxation games, since 
the payoff for person 2 is the same in all three allocations in both games. In both games 
Maximin and F&S predict the same choice, while ERC predicts a different allocation choice 
than F&S. The efficient allocation (Efficiency) coincides in game Fx with F&S and Maximin 
and in game Ex with ERC. As a consequence, it is possible to infer the relative importance of 
the two inequality models, ERC and F&S, without any confounding effects arising from 
efficiency concerns. 
 
2.2.2. Envy games 
In the three envy games presented in Table 2 (games N, Nx and Ny according to the 
classification of Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) the decision maker (i.e., person 2) is again the 
“middle income” earner. The denotation “envy games” is derived from the fact that in these 
three games the decision maker can take money both from the “high income” person 1 and the 
“low income” person 3 at the same time. In game N the payoff of person 2 is fixed, and the 
F&S-choice is Pareto-dominated by the ERC-compliant allocation, whereas the ERC-choice is 
also Pareto-dominated by the efficient/maximin choices. Games Nx and Ny are necessary to 
investigate whether selfishness dominates the non-selfish motives. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
2.2.3. Rich and Poor games 
Table 3 presents the third set of games, called “Rich and Poor” games. While the decision 
maker’s payoffs are held constant in each game, the relation to the other two players’ payoffs 
varies. In game R (P) the decision maker is the richest (poorest) group member in any 
allocation, while in game Ey the decision maker is the “middle income” earner. In the “Rich 
and Poor” games F&S and ERC predict the same choice of allocation. However, these games 
allow distinguishing between efficiency concerns, maximin preferences and inequality 
concerns. Like in the taxation games, the decision maker can reallocate money between 
person 1 and person 3, but now between the person with the “middle income” and the person 
with the “lowest income” (in game R), respectively the person with the “highest income” (in 
game P). Game Ey is identical to game Ex except that the payoff of person 2 is € 3.6 instead 
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of € 4.8. Note that this changes the ERC-prediction; it is now congruent with the allocation 
expected under F&S- and under Maximin-preferences. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
2.3. Experimental procedure 
The experiment was run in three elementary schools and four high schools in the Federal State 
of Tyrol, Austria, from January to February 2008. It was part of a larger series of experiments 
in which we visited the involved schools repeatedly over a period of two years, asking 
children to make decisions in different experimental tasks (in order to study, among others, 
their risk and time preferences – see Sutter et al., 2010 – or their competitive behavior – see 
Sutter and Rützler, 2010). The project was approved by the central school administration 
board of Tyrol and the principals of the selected schools. All parents of involved children and 
teenagers were sent a letter with information on the project and its aim to study economic 
decision making, without revealing any specific details or experimental tasks to be completed. 
Parents could of course decide against letting their child participate, and five out of the more 
than 800 did so. All other parents consented. Children and teenagers were also instructed 
clearly that participation was completely voluntary. They were told that they could earn some 
money in the experiments, and no single child refused to participate in any of the experiments 
that we conducted. 
The final number of participants was 883, aged eight to seventeen years. They were 
drawn from five different age groups, equivalent to school grades 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11. Table 4 
presents the number of participants by age and gender.4 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The experiment, the incentive mechanism and the choices to be made were explained 
in great detail to the students in all 38 single classes, following a fixed script (see the 
Appendix for the script and for the decision sheet that we used). In order to check for the 
                                                 
4 Note that one of the high schools involved is attended by girls only. Therefore, we have more girls than boys in 
our sample. There is no indication, however, that girls in single-sex schools exhibit a different behavior in our 
experiment than those in schools with co-education. 
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comprehension of the rules we asked each participant to fill out a questionnaire that included 
two control questions prior to the start of the experiment. In total, 77% of our participants 
answered both questions correctly. The right-hand side of Table 4 shows the number of 
subjects with correct answers in each age group, indicating that the relative frequency of 
correct answers is strictly increasing in age. Our entire analysis is only based on those 
subjects who answered the questions correctly. This leaves us with 679 participants. 
In order to provide roughly the same relative monetary incentives to all participants 
we varied the stake sizes with age. The amounts presented in Tables 1 to 3 are in Euros, and 
they applied for students aged fourteen to seventeen (grades 9 and 11). For the younger age 
groups (grades 3 to 7) these amounts were divided by two to account for their significantly 
lower pocket money and purchasing power.5 We presented the games a bit differently from 
the way used in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). For instance, we did not report the average 
payoffs of person 1 and 3 and the total payoff for each allocation on the decision sheet. This 
was done to keep the decision sheet as simple as possible. 
The experiment was conducted as a pen-and-paper experiment, and it took 
approximately 40 minutes, including a post-experimental questionnaire on demographic 
characteristics. The students were informed at the beginning of the experiment that they 
would never be matched with someone from their own classes, but with someone from a 
parallel class of any of the schools participating in the experiment. As a consequence, the 
matching and calculation of payoffs were conducted afterwards. Monetary earnings were 
distributed in sealed envelopes marked with a student’s ID within two weeks after the 
experiments had been conducted.6 
 
 
                                                 
5 According to the survey we conducted with the same set of children, the average pocket money for 5th graders 
is around € 5 per week, while it is about € 13-14 for 9th graders. 
6 Since we were running several experiments with the children over the course of two years, children were sure 
(and had experienced it before) that we would come back and pay them the correct earnings according to the 
rules in the experiment. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Overview of choices 
Tables 5 to 7 present an overview of the relative choice frequencies in the three different sets 
of games. We show overall averages (“Total sample”), separate average results for girls and 
boys, and also average results for each age group. In order to alleviate comparison of our 
results to choices made by adults we also include the relative choice frequencies from 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in the last line of each table. 
 
Tables 5 to 7 about here 
 
The general pattern emerging from Tables 5 to 7 is that we find noticeable differences 
between the choices of girls and boys in the Taxation games (Table 5) and the “Rich and 
Poor” games (Table 7). Age has also an influence on the choice frequencies in all three sets of 
games. In the following we present an econometric analysis of the influence of age and 
gender on social preferences. 
 
3.2. Econometric analysis of social preferences 
In the following, we conduct a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of subjects’ decisions 
following the general lines of the econometric model used in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). The 
econometric model is a mixture model in which each subject’s type is drawn from a common 
prior distribution over the five types considered in this paper: Selfishness, Efficiency, 
Maximin, F&S, ERC. A subject’s type is considered to be the same in all eight games, but 
decision makers are allowed to make errors. 
More formally, let i = 1, . . . , N index the subjects and let k = 1, . . . , 5 denote the 
different types of social preferences a subject can exhibit. Define c = 1, 2, or 3 as the number 
of type-k’s decisions in a given game. We assume that a type-k subject normally makes a type 
k decision, but in each game the subject makes an error with probability εk ∈ [0,1]. If a subject 
makes an error, she chooses each of the three available actions with probability 1/3. For a 
type-k subject, the probability of a single type k-decision is then kc
c
c
ε
3
31 −− . Accordingly, 
the probability of any single non-type k decision is εk/3. We assume that the errors are i.i.d. 
across games and subjects. 
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The likelihood function is constructed as follows. Let Tk,c denote the total number of 
games in which there are c type-k-decisions. Furthermore, ickx  represents the number of 
subject i’s decisions that equal type k’s in games in which she has c type-k-decisions and 
),,( 321 ik
i
k
i
k
i
k xxxx = , ),...,( 51 iii xxx = , and ),...,( Ni xxx = . Let kp  denote a subject’s common prior 
k-type probability, with ∑ = =5 1 1k kp  and ),...,( 51 ppp = , while kε  indicates the error rate of 
type k and ),...,( 51 εεε = . The probability of observing a particular sample with ikx  type-k 
decisions when subject i is of type k can then be expressed as: 
 
ic
kck
ic
k xT
k
x
kc
i
kk
i
k c
c
c
xL
−
= ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−∏=
,
33
31)|( 3,2,1
εεε , (3) 
Weighting the right-hand side by kp , summing over k, taking logarithms, and 
summing over i yields the log-likelihood function for the entire sample: 
 ∑ ∑= == ni k ikkikk xLpxpL 1 5 1 )(ln)|,(ln εε , (4) 
With five types the model has nine independent parameters: four independent type 
probabilities kp , and five type-error rates kε . We produce ten separate estimations of 
equation (4), separately for each age group and gender. The results on the distribution of 
social preference types using equation (4) are given in Table 8 and presented graphically in 
Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Table 8 and Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
In general, we find that Efficiency and Maximin explain the largest fraction of 
subjects’ social preferences. However, we observe clear effects of age and gender, and an 
interaction of both. From Figures 1 and 2 as well as Table 8 it is obvious that F&S-
preferences become less prominent with age. More precisely, the estimated probability of 
F&S-preferences becomes even insignificant in the two oldest age groups. ERC-preferences 
are not significant in any of our age groups. Efficiency- and Maximin-types display an 
evolution with age that is gender-specific. For boys Efficiency becomes much more important 
with age, whereas the fraction of Efficiency-types for girls remains more or less constant. The 
reverse is observed for Maximin-preferences. Here we find a strong increase of the numbers 
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classified as Maximin for girls, while (except for the youngest age group) the fraction is stable 
for boys. Efficiency concerns are significant for all age groups, for both boys and girls, and 
Maximin concerns are significant in all age groups except for the youngest one. Selfishness 
concerns remain by and large stable over all age groups, and they are almost always 
significant.7 
In order to assess the robustness of our results so far we estimate the effects of age and 
gender also with a different approach. We produce, to start with, a single, pooled estimation 
of equation (4). Then, using the estimated parameters kεˆ  and kpˆ , we compute the probability 
by which each single subject is assigned to a specific social preference type, conditional on 
the observed pattern of choices. We calculate equation (3) for each individual and type. This 
yields the probabilities to observe a given pattern of choices conditional on a type, i.e., 
)|( ii kxP , where – with a slight abuse of notation – xi denotes the choices and ki=1,…5  
denotes the type of individual i. Finally, using Bayes rule we can compute the probability that 
an individual i is of type ki, given the observed choices, i.e., )|( ii xhkP = , where h=1,…,5. 
For example, the probability that individual i belongs to the Selfishness-type (ki = 1), given 
the observed choices xi, is: 
54321
1
ˆ)5|(ˆ)4|(ˆ)3|(ˆ)2|(ˆ)1|(
ˆ)1|()|1(
pkxppkxppkxppkxppkxp
pkxpxkP
iiiii
i
iii =+=+=+=+=
===  (5) 
In five separate (tobit) regressions we regress subject i’s probability of being classified 
as a specific type on age, gender and an interaction term between age and gender. Note that 
we use an ordinal variable for the age group in all regressions – assigning values 0, 1, 2, 3, or 
4 for the five different age groups of 8/9-, 10/11-, 12/13-, 14/15-, and 16/17-year olds.8 Table 
9 presents the results of this analysis. 
 
Table 9 about here 
 
                                                 
7 From the envy games Nx and Ny we can classify a subject as selfish if she chooses “Left” in both games. For 
these subjects (roughly 40% of all participants) we can check their types in all other games where pure 
selfishness is not feasible. Interestingly, we find that a majority of them behaves consistent with the Maximin-
prediction in most other games. Hence, the second most important concern for selfish players, on average, is 
welfare maximization if their own payoff is not affected. 
8 The results do not change qualitatively if we use the subjects’ exact age. 
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The probability of Selfishness as a subject’s type is constant across the five age groups 
and is not explained by gender. Efficiency, however, is increasing with age for boys and 
constant for girls. More precisely, the probability of being of the Efficiency-type is the same 
for boys and girls in the youngest age group of eight- to nine-year olds, but it is significantly 
higher for boys in all other age groups. Maximin-preferences become more prominent with 
increasing age for girls, but their prominence remains constant across all age groups for boys. 
On the contrary, the probability of being of the Maximin-type is significantly higher for girls 
than for boys in all age groups except for the youngest one. 
The likelihood of exhibiting F&S-preferences is decreasing with age, for both boys 
and girls. There are no significant gender differences in the two youngest age groups up to the 
age of eleven years. In the three oldest age groups girls have significantly higher values, i.e., 
they care more about inequality than boys. Finally, the probability that a subject’s behavior is 
explained by the ERC-model is decreasing with increasing age for males. However, there are 
no significant gender differences in the different age groups. The likelihood of exhibiting 
ERC-preferences is lower than for all other social preference types. 
The overall picture emerging from Table 9 can be summarized as follows: When 
children and teenagers grow older, they are less likely to be motivated by inequality aversion, 
while efficiency-concerns become much more important for boys, and the desire to maximize 
the payoff of the worst-off group member becomes more widespread among girls. 
From data collected in a post-experimental questionnaire we can also examine how 
socio-demographic variables are related to a subject’s social preferences. Including the 
weekly amount of pocket money, a dummy for sharing the room with siblings, and a dummy 
for being the only child in the family into the regressions (see Table 10) does not change our 
general results. However, we find evidence that children who share their rooms with siblings 
are significantly more likely to be of the Efficiency-type and less likely to hold Maximin-
preferences. Moreover, the probability of being of the Maximin-type is significantly lower for 
subjects who receive more weekly pocket money, and F&S-preferences are more common 
among these subjects. 
 
Table 10 about here 
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4. Conclusion 
We have studied the influence of age and gender on the distribution of individual social 
preferences in an experiment where subjects had to make simple, fully incentivized allocation 
choices. The experiment was run with more than 800 eight- to seventeen-year old children 
and adolescents. Each participant had to make eight choices, from which we have been able to 
estimate social preference types for every participating individual. Our model is able to 
consider five types of preferences: selfishness, efficiency concerns (by maximizing the sum of 
payoffs), maximin preferences (by maximizing the payoff of the worst off), and two forms of 
inequality aversion (based on the models by Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000). 
Our results show that roughly 20% of decision makers in our experiment behave 
selfishly, and this fraction does neither depend on age nor on gender. Pure inequality aversion 
plays a role for a non-negligible fraction of decision maker in our younger age groups 
(explaining about 30% of decisions for our group of eight- and nine-year olds), where the 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model turns out to be the empirically more suitable model to explain 
choices than ERC (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In general, pure inequality aversion becomes 
less important as our subjects grow older. While the decline is somewhat less steep for girls 
than for boys, the age effect is clearly visible for both, dropping to around 5% of subjects 
estimated to have inequality aversion preferences in the group of sixteen- to seventeen-year 
olds. However, one has to bear in mind that both inequality aversion models abstract from 
efficiency concerns. Consequently, it is not too surprising that, once efficiency clearly comes 
into play by the design of the allocation decisions, pure inequality aversion models do not fare 
very well in predicting choice behavior. 
Other types of social preferences follow a clear pattern with age and gender. While 
efficiency concerns are increasing with age in our male sample (from about 30% at the age of 
eight to roughly 50% at the age of seventeen) and stay constant around 20% for females, the 
pattern is reversed for maximin-preferences. The latter become more important for females 
when they grow up, but stay rather constant for boys. It has to be emphasized that the 
youngest children in our sample neither show any significant difference in the importance of 
efficiency concerns for boys and girls nor in the importance of maximin-preferences. Hence, 
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both concerns seem to be equally relevant in young children. However, in the teenage years a 
strikingly divergent development of boys and girls takes place. 
It is certainly an important route for future research to study why this is the case, and 
at this stage, it is only possible to speculate about the potential driving forces behind the 
divergence between females’ and males’ social preferences when they grow older. One 
conceivable mechanism is social learning. For instance, there is evidence that the impact of 
role models on the behavior of teens becomes strongly differentiated for men and women in 
adolescence (Kail and Cavanaugh, 2010). How these role models are associated with the 
evolution of social preferences and why they could make maximin-preferences more 
prevalent in women and efficiency-concerns more important in men’s allocation decisions 
seems worthwhile investigating in greater detail in the future. 
In any case, it appears to be relevant for the understanding of social preferences and 
their origins to study how they change across childhood and adolescence and at which age 
gender differences occur. While social preferences might be rather stable in adulthood (even 
though we have little direct empirical evidence on their stability across different adult age 
groups, either), they seem to be developing in a systematic way in growing up children. 
Economists should be interested in the evolution of (social) preferences and possible gender 
differences in their development because social preferences shape economically relevant 
decisions of teenagers in the domains of education, employment, and consumption. Our paper 
should be seen as a first step in providing large-scale experimental evidence on the 
relationship of social preferences with age and gender. Much more has to be done. For 
instance, we even lack a comprehensive treatment of gender differences in social preferences 
among adult decision makers.9 In an excellent overview Croson and Gneezy (2009) look at 
gender differences in preferences. No study in their overview provides a comprehensive 
treatment of the distribution across females and males over the five preference types that we 
discussed in this paper. Especially efficiency concerns and maximin-preferences have not 
been studied systematically in papers on gender differences, as far as we know. Hence, some 
of the apparent inconclusiveness of the results of studies on gender differences in adults could 
be due to the neglect of these two motives. While single studies provide important evidence 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, neither Engelmann and Strobel (2004) nor Charness and Rabin (2002) split up their 
results with regard to gender. In a comment on the former paper using a subset of their games Fehr, Naef and 
Schmidt (2006) find a weakly significant effect of women being more egalitarian than men. 
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on a possible interaction of gender and social preferences, we want to make a case here for 
more comprehensive and larger-scale experiments under controlled conditions as a promising 
way to advance research in this area. 
Economists should, furthermore, care about the development of social preferences in 
childhood because the results of economic experiments might prove helpful in optimizing 
(economic) education for children. For instance, it could give guidance on how to make 
children aware of different sharing norms when they interact. Given our results, it is very 
likely that older girls and boys prefer different solutions in certain allocation problems, and 
being knowledgeable of the differences could avoid conflicts in negotiations or bargaining in 
private life in families and with friends, and in professional life in companies and 
organizations. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Taxation games (payoffs in euro) 
 Game Fx Game Ex 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.4 6.8 5.2 
Person 2 payoff 4 4 4 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Person 3 payoff 3.6 2 0.4 1.2 1.6 2 
Total payoff 14.4 13.2 12 14.4 13.2 12 
Prediction       
Selfish  Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Efficiency  Left   Left   
Maximin  Left     Right 
F&S  Left     Right 
ERC    Right Left   
 
 
Table 2: Envy games (payoffs in euro) 
 Game N Game Nx Game Ny 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 6.4 5.2 4.0 6.4 5.2 4.0 4.0 5.2 6.4 
Person 2 payoff 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.8 
Person 3 payoff 2.0 1.2 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.4 1.2 2.0 
Total payoff 11.6 9.6 7.6 12.0 9.6 7.2 8.0 9.6 11.2 
Prediction        
Selfish  Left Middle Right Left   Left   
Efficiency Left   Left     Right 
Maximin Left   Left     Right 
F&S   Right Left  Right Left   
ERC  Middle  Left Middle  Left Middle  
 
 
 
Table 3: “Rich and Poor” games (payoffs in euro) 
 Game R Game P Game Ey 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle  Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 2.0 3.2 4.4 3.2 4.4 5.6 5.2 6.8 8.4 
Person 2 payoff 4.8 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Person 3 payoff 1.6 1.2 0.8 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2 
Total payoff 8.4 9.2 10.0 7.6 8.4 9.2 10.8 12.0 13.2 
Prediction    
Selfish Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Efficiency   Right   Right   Right 
Maximin Left   Left Middle Right Left   
F&S    Right Left   Left   
ERC    Right Left   Left   
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Table 4: Number of participants by age and gender 
  
All subjects 
 Subjects with correct answers in 
control questions 
 Girls Boys Total  Girls Boys Total % valid 
8/9 years (3rd grade) 56 60 116  31 33 64 55.2 % 
10/11 years (5th grade) 144 95 239  101 65 166 69.5 % 
12/13 years (7th grade) 122 88 210  96 74 170 81.0 % 
14/15 years (9th grade) 106 63 169  92 54 146 86.4 % 
16/17 years (11th grade) 86 63 149  77 56 133 89.3 % 
Total 514 369 883  397 282 679 76.9 % 
 
 
 
Table 5: Taxation games – Choice frequencies 
 Game Fx Game Ex 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.4 6.8 5.2 
Person 2 payoff 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Person 3 payoff 3.6 2.0 0.4 1.2 1.6 2.0 
Choices, percentages       
Total sample 69.4 18.7 11.9 32.3 9.8 57.9 
Boys 64.5 19.2 16.3 43.7 9.7 46.6 
Girls 72.8 18.4 8.8 24.3 9.9 65.8 
8/9 years old 59.4 15.6 25.0 38.1 12.7 49.2 
10/11 years old 60.2 22.9 16.9 30.5 9.2 60.4 
12/13 years old 67.1 22.9 10.0 27.2 10.1 62.7 
14/15 years old 72.6 17.8 9.6 39.3 6.2 54.5 
16/17 years old 85.0 10.5 4.5 30.8 12.8 56.4 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 86.7 6.7 6.7 40.0 16.7 43.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Envy games – Choice frequencies 
 Treatment N Treatment Nx Treatment Ny 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 6.4 5.2 4.0 6.4 5.2 4.0 4.0 5.2 6.4 
Person 2 payoff 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.8 
Person 3 payoff 2.0 1.2 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.4 1.2 2.0 
Choices, percentage          
Total sample 69.6 12.1 18.3 89.1 7.0 4.0 44.8 17.4 37.8 
Boys 71.9 11.4 16.7 89.3 6.1 4.6 45.4 13.1 41.5 
Girls 68.0 12.6 19.4 88.9 7.6 3.5 44.4 20.5 35.1 
8/9 years old 46.0 22.2 31.8 65.1 19.1 15.9 46.9 12.5 40.6 
10/11 years old 67.5 12.1 20.5 86.6 8.5 4.9 45.5 6.7 47.9 
12/13 years old 70.6 8.8 20.6 92.9 2.9 4.1 44.1 15.3 40.6 
14/15 years old 76.7 12.3 11.0 90.4 8.2 1.4 37.0 24.7 38.4 
16/17 years old 74.4 11.3 14.3 97.0 3.0 0.0 52.6 27.8 19.6 
Engelmann/Strobel (2004) 70.0 26.7 3.3 76.7 13.3 10.0 60.0 16.7 23.3 
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Table 7: Rich and Poor games – Choice frequencies 
 Treatment R Treatment P Treatment Ey 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 2.0 3.2 4.4 3.2 4.4 5.6 5.2 6.8 8.4 
Person 2 payoff 4.8 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Person 3 payoff 1.6 1.2 0.8 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2 
Choices, percentage          
Total sample 47.0 27.4 25.6 39.3 21.5 39.2 50.1 14.3 35.6 
Boys 38.4 29.5 32.0 33.0 18.8 48.2 42.0 11.0 47.0 
Girls 53.2 25.8 21.0 43.8 23.4 32.8 55.8 16.7 27.5 
8/9 years old 46.9 21.9 31.3 32.8 20.3 46.9 46.9 15.6 37.5 
10/11 years old 49.7 17.0 33.3 44.6 19.3 36.1 55.5 18.3 26.2 
12/13 years old 50.3 21.3 28.4 43.5 23.5 32.9 50.6 14.1 35.3 
14/15 years old 38.4 43.8 17.8 31.5 21.2 47.3 43.2 11.6 45.2 
16/17 years old 49.2 32.6 18.2 39.1 22.6 38.4 51.9 12.0 36.1 
Engelmann/Strobel (2004) 53.3 20.0 26.7 33.3 6.7 60.0 36.7 23.3 40 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimated distribution of social preference-types by gender and age 
  Females Males 
 Type Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Age group 8/9 Selfishness 0.135 0.084 0.292  *** 0.112 
 Efficiency 0.219  ** 0.090 0.268  *** 0.080 
 Maximin 0.318 0.203 0.072 0.052 
 F&S 0.292  * 0.158 0.338  *** 0.114 
 ERC 0.036 0.035 0.031 0.030 
Age group 10/11 Selfishness 0.186  *** 0.052 0.138  ** 0.058 
 Efficiency 0.249  *** 0.051 0.350  *** 0.072 
 Maximin 0.356  *** 0.062 0.270  *** 0.082 
 F&S 0.166  *** 0.049 0.168  ** 0.068 
 ERC 0.043 0.029 0.074 0.054 
Age group 12/13 Selfishness 0.138  ** 0.064 0.199  *** 0.064 
 Efficiency 0.180  *** 0.066 0.414  *** 0.078 
 Maximin 0.468  *** 0.068 0.293  *** 0.087 
 F&S 0.191  *** 0.055 0.061 0.041 
 ERC 0.023 0.027 0.033 0.036 
Age group 14/15 Selfishness 0.109  ** 0.054 0.053 0.078 
 Efficiency 0.334  *** 0.071 0.600  *** 0.085 
 Maximin 0.475  *** 0.086 0.320  *** 0.116 
 F&S 0.065 0.043 0.000 0.000 
 ERC 0.017 0.055 0.027 0.024 
Age group 16/17 Selfishness 0.141  ** 0.064 0.270  *** 0.088 
 Efficiency 0.152  *** 0.042 0.459  *** 0.080 
 Maximin 0.609  *** 0.091 0.271  *** 0.076 
 F&S 0.060 0.053 0.000 0.000 
 ERC 0.038 0.027 0.000 0.000 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table 9: Determinants of social-preference types (second step regressions) 
Explanatory variables  Selfishness     Efficiency   Maximin         F&S     ERC 
Age -0.009 0.044  ** 0.013 -0.036  *** -0.013  *** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005) 
Female -0.008 -0.053 0.087 -0.002 -0.024 
 (0.037) (0.059) (0.057) (0.036) (0.017) 
Age*Female 0.002 -0.057  ** 0.026 0.018 0.011  * 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007) 
Constant 0.161  *** 0.319  *** 0.272  *** 0.179  *** 0.068  *** 
 (0.028) (0.044) (0.042) (0.027) (0.012) 
# of observations 679 679 679 679 679 
Age+Age*Female -0.006 -0.013 0.039  *** -0.018  * -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.004) 
Female+(Age*Female) -0.006 -0.109  *** 0.112  *** 0.015 -0.013 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.039) (0.025) (0.011) 
Female+(Age*Female)*2 -0.003 -0.166  *** 0.138  *** 0.033  * -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.009) 
Female+(Age*Female)*3 -0.001 -0.223  *** 0.164  *** 0.051  ** 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.036) (0.034) (0.022) (0.010) 
Female+(Age*Female)*4 0.002 -0.280  *** 0.189  *** 0.068  ** 0.021 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.050) (0.033) (0.015) 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, standard errors in parentheses. 
a) Age+Age*Female measures the effect of age in female subjects; b) Female+(Age*Female)*x – where x=0, 
1,…, 4 – measures the effect of female in different age groups. 
  
 
 
Table 10: Determinants of social-preference types including background variables 
(second-step regressions) 
Explanatory variables  Selfishness     Efficiency   Maximin        F&S     ERC 
Age -0.015 0.052  *** 0.019 -0.044  *** -0.013  ** 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.005) 
Female -0.013 -0.035 0.073 -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.038) (0.059) (0.057) (0.037) (0.017) 
Age*Female 0.004 -0.062  *** 0.029 0.018 0.011  * 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007) 
Pocket money 0.001 0.000 -0.002** 0.001* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Share room -0.024 0.069** -0.051* 0.002 0.006 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.029) (0.019) (0.009) 
Only child 0.018 0.034 -0.003 -0.036 -0.012 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.041) (0.026) (0.012) 
Constant 0.173  *** 0.276  *** 0.297  *** 0.187  *** 0.068  *** 
 (0.030) (0.048) (0.046) (0.030) (0.014) 
# of observations 679 679 679 679 679 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Girls’ estimated distribution of social preference-types 
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Figure 2: Boys’ estimated distribution of social preference-types 
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Left Middle Right 
Person 1 2.00 € 1.00 € 2.80 € 
Person 2 4.00 € 4.00 € 4.00 € 
Person 3 6.00 € 7.80 € 4.40 € 
Appendix (not intended for publication) 
Experimental Instructions 
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of the game to you. 
From now on, please don’t speak to your neighbor and listen carefully. You can earn money 
in this game. We will give you the money in cash within the next two weeks. We will put 
your money in a sealed envelope, which is labeled with your id-code. This envelope will be 
given personally to you by us. It is important that you listen carefully now, so that you 
understand the rules of our game. If you have any questions, we will answer them after we 
have explained the rules of the game. 
In this game you have to decide how you are going to divide a certain amount of 
money among three people. We call those three people person 1, person 2, and person 3. 
Person 2 decides on the allocation of the money. 
At the end of the game each of you will draw a role (person 1, person 2, or person 3) 
out of this bag. Additionally we will form groups of three people for this game. Each group 
consists of one student from your class, one student from your parallel class, and one student 
from another class in the same year, but in a different school. Furthermore each group consists 
of one person 1, one person 2 and one person 3. In each group person 2 decides on the 
allocation of the payoffs. 
Let’s now turn to the allocation of the payoffs. For this purpose we have prepared an 
example task that looks very similar in structure to what you will see in the actual experiment. 
In this example – and in all eight games in the experiment – there are three possibilities to 
divide some money. With option “Left” person 1 gets 2 € in this example, person 2 gets 4 € 
and person 3 gets 6 €. With option “Middle” person 1 gets 1 €, person 2 gets 4 € and person 3 
gets 7.8 €. With option “Right” person 1 gets 2.8 €, person 2 gets 4 € and person 3 gets 4.4 €. 
[Slide used on the overhead projector] 
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Remember, only person 2 decides on the allocation of the payoffs. 
All of you receive a decision sheet with altogether eight such decisions to make. 
Please decide eight times either for “Left”, “Middle” or “Right”, always in the role of person 
2. [Ask students why they should fill out their decision sheet in the role of person 2.] 
In the end you will get the payoff from one of these eight games. First you will draw a 
card that determines which person you are in your group. Then each of you may roll this 8-
sided dice [Show the dice to students.] once after the decisions sheet has been completed. The 
number shown on the dice will determine the game that is paid out for real. Note that only if 
you are person 2 then your own decision will determine your payoff. 
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Left Middle Right 
Game 1 
Left Middle Right 
Person 1 5.20 € 6.80 € 8.40 € 
Person 2 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 
Person 3 2.00 € 1.60 € 1.20 € 
Game 8 
Left Middle Right 
Person 1 3.20 € 4.40 € 5.60 € 
Person 2 1.60 € 1.60 € 1.60 € 
Person 3 2.80 € 2.40 € 2.00 € 
Game 7 
Left Middle Right 
Person 1 2.00 € 3.20 € 4.40 € 
Person 2 4.80 € 4.80 € 4.80 € 
Person 3 1.60 € 1.20 € 0.80 € 
Game 6 
Left Middle Right 
Person 1 4.00 € 5.20 € 6.40 € 
Person 2 3.60 € 3.20 € 2.80 € 
Person 3 0.40 € 1.20 € 2.00 € 
Game 5 
Left Middle Right 
Person 1 6.40 € 5.20 € 4.00 € 
Person 2 3.60 € 3.20 € 2.80 € 
Person 3 2.00 € 1.20 € 0.40 € 
Game 4 
Left Middle Right 
Person 1 6.40 € 5.20 € 4.00 € 
Person 2 3.20 € 3.20 € 3.20 € 
Person 3 2.00 € 1.20 € 0.40 € 
Game 3 
Left Middle Right
Person 1 8.40 € 6.80 € 5.20 € 
Person 2 4.80 € 4.80 € 4.80 € 
Person 3 1.20 € 1.60 € 2.00 €
Game 2 
The eight games on the decision sheet 
 
 
 
Person 1 6.80 € 7.20 € 7.60 € 
Person 2 4.00 € 4.00 € 4.00 € 
Person 3 3.60 € 2.00 € 0.40 € 
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Social preferences in childhood and adolescence – A large-scale experiment 
 
Abstract 
 
Social preferences have been shown to be an important determinant of economic 
decision making for many adults. We present a large-scale experiment with 883 
children and adolescents, aged eight to seventeen years. Participants make 
decisions in eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks, allowing us to study the 
distribution of social preference types across age and across gender. Our results 
show that when children and teenagers grow older, inequality aversion becomes a 
gradually less prominent motivating force of allocation decisions. At the same time, 
efficiency concerns increase in importance for boys, and maximin-preferences turn 
more important in shaping decisions of girls. 
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